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Abstract. Distributions of anthropogenic signatures (impacts and activities) are mathematically 
analysed. The aim is to understand the Anthropocene and to see whether anthropogenic signatures 
could be used to determine its beginning. A total of 23 signatures were analysed and results are 
presented in 31 diagrams. Some of these signatures contain undistinguishable natural components 
but most of them are of purely anthropogenic origin. Great care was taken to identify abrupt 
accelerations, which could be used to determine the beginning of the Anthropocene. Results of the 
analysis can be summarised in three conclusions. 1. Anthropogenic signatures cannot be used to 
determine the beginning of the Anthropocene. 2. There was no abrupt Great Acceleration around 
1950 or around any other time. 3. Anthropogenic signatures are characterised by the Great 
Deceleration in the second half of the 20th century. The second half of the 20th century does not 
mark the beginning of the Anthropocene but most likely the beginning of the end of the strong 
anthropogenic impacts, maybe even the beginning of a transition to a sustainable future. The 
Anthropocene is a unique stage in human experience but it has no clearly marked beginning and it 
is probably not a new geological epoch.  
Keywords. The Anthropocene, Anthropogenic impacts and activities, Great Acceleration, 
Sustainable future.  
 
1. Introduction 
teffen et al. (2004, pp. 132, 133) published an excellent sets of diagrams illustrating 
the rapidly increasing human activities in recent years. These diagrams became 
exceptionally popular but they have never been mathematically analysed. They 
contain a rich source of information, which has never been explored. By now, new data 
became available and my aim is to analyse them mathematically, because reliable and 
complete information can be obtained only by a rigorous examination of evidence.     
Anthropogenic signatures (activities and impacts) have been rapidly increasing in recent 
years. Their primary driving force is the rapid growth of population but their combined 
intensity is reflected in the economic growth, which is closely linked with such 
anthropogenic signatures as the production and consumption of energy, consumption of 
fertilizers, pollution of the atmosphere, land and water, water consumption, land 
degradation, loss of tropical forests, consumption of marine resources, ocean acidification, 
stratospheric ozone depletion, increased transportation, increased consumption of 
renewable and non-renewable resources, interference with nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, 
and more. Maybe all anthropogenic impacts and activities are embodied in the economic 
growth but if not all, then many of them are. Economic growth appears to reflect the 
combined intensity of anthropogenic impacts and activities. It is hard, maybe even 
impossible, to decouple economic growth from environmental impacts. Recent study of 
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this issue resulted in the following conclusion: “It is therefore misleading to develop 
growth-oriented policy around the expectation that decoupling is possible” (Ward, Sutton, 
Werner, Costanza, Mohr, & Simmons, 2016, p. e0164733-10).  
Anthropogenic impacts and activities are closely correlated with the growth of 
population. As observed by Waters, et al. (2016, p. aad2622-2) the “increase in the 
consumption of natural resources is closely linked with the growth of the human 
population.” Correlations might not be linear but it is hardly surprising that with the rapidly 
increasing population human activities and impacts have been also rapidly increasing. 
The rapid increase in the intensity of anthropogenic signatures in recent years is 
discussed extensively in my book (Nielsen, 2006). This apparently new phenomenon is 
described as the Anthropocene (see for instance Crutzen, 2004; Crutzen & Stoermer, 2000; 
Ehlers & Krafft, 2006; Steffen, Grinevald, Crutzen & McNeill, 2011; Zalasiewicz, 
Williams, Steffen & Crutzen 2010), which is now proposed to be recognised as a new 
geological epoch.  However, all attempts to determine its beginning have been so far 
unsuccessful.  
In order to accept the Anthropocene as a new geological epoch, a convincing 
stratigraphic evidence has to be presented but it would be also helpful to show that the 
beginning of the Anthropocene is convincingly demonstrated by a sharp acceleration in the 
intensity of anthropogenic signatures. They should have a clearly marked beginning.  
Such a close examination of data has never been done before but according to Steffen 
et al. (2004), who compiled and published the sets of diagrams illustrating the rapidly 
increasing anthropogenic impacts and who examined them visually, there was a sharp 
increase in anthropogenic activities around 1950: “Sharp changes in the slope of the curves 
occur around the 1950s in each case and illustrate how the past 50 years have been a period 
of dramatic and unprecedented change in human experience” (Steffen, et al. 2004, p. 132; 
emphasis added). This description leaves no doubt about the interpretation of diagrams 
illustrating anthropogenic signatures. It is not a monotonic increase but an increase 
characterised by a commonly occurring abrupt acceleration around 1950.   
A few years later, this postulate of sharp changes was reinforced by the introduction of 
the concept of the Great Acceleration (Hibbard, et al., 2007). According to these authors, 
“Since the 1950s, there has been a Great Acceleration in the scope, scale, and intensity of 
mutual impacts on the human–environment system” (Hibbard, et al., 2007, p. 343). Again, 
there is no doubt how the concept of the Great Acceleration is interpreted. It does not 
describe a gradual and rapid increase but a rapid acceleration at a certain time, which is 
around 1950.   
It has been, therefore, natural to suggest that the Great Acceleration could be used to 
determine the beginning of the Anthropocene: “Although there has been much debate 
around the proposed start date for the Anthropocene, the beginning of the Great 
Acceleration has been a leading candidate (Zalasiewicz et al., 2012)” (Steffen, Broadgate, 
Deutsch, Gaffney & Ludwig, 2015, p. 83; emphasis added).  
It is a reasonable suggestion but first it would have to be convincingly demonstrated 
that there was a great acceleration around 1950. This has never been done and no-one seems 
to be interested in doing it maybe because the concept of the Great Acceleration is by now 
so firmly established that no-one seems to question its validity. An excellent compilation 
of data describing time-dependent distributions of the intensity of individual anthropogenic 
impacts and activities was published by the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme 
(Ludwig, 2014). It is interesting to notice that while great care was taken to present reliable 
data, the concept of the Great Acceleration is accepted without any reservation: “The 
second half of the 20th Century is unique in the history of human existence. Many human 
activities reached take-off points sometime in the 20th Century and sharply accelerated 
towards the end of the century. The last 60 years have without doubt seen the most profound 
3 
 
transformation of the human relationship with the natural world in the history of 
humankind” (IGBP, 2015; emphasis added).  
The beginning of the “last 60 years” is around 1950. Clearly, the article promotes the 
idea that “without doubt” “the most profound transformation of the human relationship 
with the natural world in the history of humankind” commended around 1950 and that this 
“profound transformation” is characterised by a sharp acceleration in human activities. 
Concept of the Great Acceleration around 1950 was not only published recently in one 
of the most prestigious, peer-reviewed scientific journals (Waters et al., 2016) but also 
popularised by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC, 2016). The article 
published in Science (Waters, et al. 2016) in preparation for the final submission of the 
proposal for accepting the Anthropocene as the new geological epoch, contains a clear and 
unambiguous claim in its title: “The Anthropocene is functionally and stratigraphically 
distinct from the Holocene.” In this article, concept of the Great Acceleration is accepted 
without any reservation and is repeatedly featured in various diagrams. Maybe it will be 
also featured in the final submission for the acceptance of the Anthropocene as a new 
geological epoch. “The inflection point at ~1950 CE coincides with the Great Acceleration 
(8, 9), a prominent rise in economic activity and resource consumption that accounts for 
the marked mid-20th century upturns in or inceptions of the anthropogenic signals” 
(Waters, et al., 2016, p. aad2622-3). Here again, there is no ambiguity about the way the 
Great Acceleration is understood and described. It is an acceleration at a specific time and 
this specific time is around 1950.  
The “prominent rise in economic activity and resource consumption” around 1950 
would have to be convincingly demonstrated before claiming it in support of the 
Anthropocene as a new geological epoch.   
It is my aim now to analyse mathematically distributions describing recent 
anthropogenic signatures in order to understand their dynamics. In my analysis I shall use 
the excellent compilation of data prepared and published by Ludwig (2014), with the 
exception of the data describing the growth of population and economic growth, because 
in the past few years I have carried out extensive investigation of these issues (Nielsen, 
2014, 2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f, 2016g, 2016h, 2016i, 2016j, 
2016k, 2016l, 2016m, 2016n, 2016o, 2016p, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017f, 
2017g). All this research was essential for the correct understanding of the Anthropocene. 
This surge of publications in the last two years represents an accumulation of my earlier 
papers, which I could not publish because Griffith University does not give financial 
support for the publication of research results. Papers may be accepted for publication but 
they are not published until authors can find a free outlet, which is not always easy. 
My analysis of the growth of population and of economic growth was supported by a 
full set of data presented in the following publications: Biraben, 1980; Birdsell, 1972; 
Clark,1968; Cook,1960; Deevey, 1960; Durand, 1974; Gallant, 1990; Hassan, 2002; Haub, 
1995; Livi-Bacci, 1997; Maddison, 2010; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Taeuber & Taeuber, 
1949; Thomlinson, 1975; Trager, 1994, United Nations, 1973, 1999, 2013; US Census 
Bureau, 2017. Some of the historical data were conveniently compiled by Manning (2008) 
and by US Census Bureau (2017).  
Analysis of the remaining anthropogenic signatures is based on the data published by 
the International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (Ludwig, 2014). References to the 
respective individual sets of data are listed in her compilation. I have also included data for 
the carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels (EPI, 2013).  
The primary aim of my study is to understand the past growth and to identify sudden 
accelerations, which could be used in support of the concept of the Great Acceleration 
around 1950. My aim is not to predict growth. Such investigations would have to be carried 
out separately. Possible future trajectories will be presented but only to understand the 
overall dynamics of growth. 
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2. Definitions 
Growth of population and economic growth ware increasing hyperbolically in the past 
2,000,000 years (Nielsen, 2017c). Hyperbolic growth is described by the reciprocal of a 
decreasing linear function: 
 
1( )S t
a kt
=
−
.                 (1) 
 
where ( )S t is the size of the growing entity, a  and k are positive constants and t is the 
time. 
For a good quality data over a sufficiently large range, hyperbolic growth can be 
uniquely identified by the decreasing liner distribution of its reciprocal values (Nielsen, 
2014, 2017f): 
 
1
( )
a kt
S t
= −  ,                 (2) 
 
Hyperbolic distributions escape to infinity at a fixed time when /t a k= or when their 
reciprocal values are zero. 
Extended or higher-order hyperbolic growth can be described by the reciprocal of higher 
order polynomials.  
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If restriction for n  is removed, then eqn (3) includes also the first-order hyperbolic 
distribution described by the eqn (1).   
Exponential growth is described by the following equation: 
 
( ) rtS t ce= ,                 (4) 
 
where c  is the normalisation constant related to the constant of integration and r is the 
growth rate. 
For a good quality data over a sufficiently large range, exponential growth can be 
uniquely identified by the straight line in the semilogarithmic display because  
 
ln ( ) lnS t c rt= + .                 (5) 
 
Extended or higher-order exponential growth is described by the following equation: 
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∑ .                       (6) 
 
The normalisation constant is given by 0a . Equation (6) can be described as the higher 
order exponential distribution depending on the order of the polynomial.  
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Growth rate R is defined as  
 
1 ( )
( )
dS tR
S t dt
= .                 (7) 
 
For a discrete set of values, it is calculated using the following formula: 
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Growth rates can be used to find appropriate mathematical descriptions of data (Nielsen, 
2017e).  
Growth rate can be represented as a function of time or as a function of the size of the 
growing entity. If it is represented as a function of time, then there is a general solution to 
the relevant differential equation, which can be used to calculate mathematical distribution 
describing growth.  
If 
 
1 ( ) ( )
( )
dS t f t
S t dt
= ,                (9) 
 
then  
 
( ) exp ( )S t f t dt= ∫ .              (10) 
 
If growth rate is represented as  
 
( )f t a bt= + ,                (11) 
 
then 
 
2( ) exp( 0.5 )S t at bt C= + + ,              (12) 
 
where C  is a constant of integration, which is determined by comparing calculated curve 
with data.  
This expression can be presented as  
 
2
0 1 2( ) exp( )S t a a t a t= + + .              (13) 
 
It is a second-order exponential distribution. If 2 0a > , i.e. if growth rate is described 
by an increasing linear function, then the distribution described by eqn (13) continues to 
increase indefinitely with time. In this case, the second-order exponential distribution is 
continually accelerating. If 2 0a < , then the distribution described by eqn (13) will reach a 
maximum and will start to decrease. It is a distribution, which is continually decelerating. 
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Parameters 1a  and 2a determine the shape of the distribution, while parameter 0a is just 
the normalization constant, which has to be determined by comparing the calculated 
distribution with data.            
If growth rate decreases exponentially with time, i.e. if 
 
1 ( )
( )
btdS t ae
S t dt
= ,              (14) 
 
then (Nielsen, 2017e) 
 
( ) exp btaS t C e
b
 =   
.               (15) 
 
It is a pseudo-logistic growth because, with the increasing time, the size the growing 
entity increases asymptotically to the constant C . This is one of the two types of 
trajectories, which describe the current growth of the world population (Nielsen, 2017e).   
If growth rate depends linearly on the size of the growing entity, i.e. if  
 
0 1
1 dS a a S
S dt
= + ,              (16) 
 
and if 0 0a ≠  , then (Nielsen, 2017e) 
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,               (17) 
 
where  
 
0 01
0 0
1 a taC e
S a
 
= + 
 
.               (18) 
 
If 0 0a >  and 1 0a < , i.e. if growth rate is decreasing linearly with the size of the 
growing entity, then eqn (17) describes logistic growth.  
If 1 0a > , then eqn (17) describes a pseudo-hyperbolic growth, which escapes to infinity 
at a fixed time.  
If 0 0a = , then eqn (16) is 
 
1
1 dS a S
S dt
=               (19) 
 
It describes the first-order hyperbolic growth and has to be solved separately. Its solution 
is by substitution 1Z S −= . If eqn (19) is expressed as   
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 1 dS kS
S dt
= ,               (20) 
 
then its solution is given by eqn (1).  
If k is not constant but is assumed to depend on time, i.e. if k is replaced by ( )k t , then 
the eqn (20) is 
 
1 ( )dS k t S
S dt
= ,               (21) 
 
and its solution is 
 
1
( ) ( )S t k t dt
−
 = −  ∫ .               (22) 
 
If ( )k t is represented by a polynomial, then the eqn (22) can be expressed as eqn (3).  
I shall always use the simplest mathematical descriptions of growth trajectories, as 
described in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. The simplest representations of data used in the analysis of 
anthropogenic signatures. 
 
Growth Rate Growth Growth Trajectory 
( )R t r=  Exponential ( ) rtS t ce=  
1 2( )R t a a t= +  Second-order 
exponential 
2
0 1 2( ) exp( )S t a a t a t= + +  
( )R S kS=  Hyperbolic 1( ) ( )S t a kt −= −  
0 1( )R S a a S= +   
0 0a ≠ , 1 0a >  
Pseudo-
hyperbolic 0
1
1
0
( ) a t aS t Ce
a
−
− = − 
 
 
0 1( )R S a a S= +   
0 0a > , 1 0a <  
Logistic 
0
1
1
0
( ) a t aS t Ce
a
−
− = − 
 
 
( ) btR t ae=  Pseudo-logistic ( ) exp btaS t C e
b
 =   
 
( )R t – growth rate expressed as a function of time;  ( )R S – growth rate expressed 
as a function of the size of the growing entity 
  
 
Mathematical formulae listed in Table 1 are derived by using the simplest 
representations of growth rates, which are in general linear. However, I have also included 
an exponential representation, which is also relatively simple and applies, for instance, to 
the recent growth of the world population (Nielsen, 2017e).  
It should be also noted that the general trend of distributions describing growth is 
determined only by the general trend of growth rates (Nielsen, 2017e). In general, 
fluctuation and oscillations in growth rates have no impact on the general trends of growth 
trajectories. This relation between growth rates and the corresponding distributions 
describing growth simplifies analysis of data.  
If good quality data are available, growth rate should be always calculated and analysed 
because it can assist in a unique identification of growth trajectories. For instance, data 
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might be represented equally well by a linear distribution, exponential distribution or by a 
second-order exponential distribution. In such a case, the usual procedure should be to 
select the linear distribution because it is the simplest representation of data. However, if 
growth rate increases with time, then the only option, out of these three possibilities, is the 
more complicated second-order exponential distribution because for the linear distribution 
the growth rate decreases hyperbolically with time and for the exponential distribution it 
is constant.  
It is also important to understand that the decreasing growth rate does not necessarily 
describe the decreasing growth trajectories. As long as growth rate is on average positive, 
the corresponding growth trajectory will be increasing. If growth rate is on average constant 
or increasing, the corresponding growth will follow an increasing and accelerating 
trajectory. If growth rate is on average positive and decreasing, growth trajectory will be 
also increasing but decelerating. Growth trajectory will be decreasing only if growth rate 
is on average negative.  
 
3. Analysis of data 
 
3.1. Growth of population and economic growth 
 
 
Figure 1. Data describing growth of the world population (Maddison, 2010) follow closely a 
hyperbolic distribution defined by parameters 08.724 10a ×= and 34.267 10k −×= . Growth of 
population was not exponential, as first interpreted by Malthus (1798) but hyperbolic. There was no 
population explosion but a monotonic transition from a slow to fast growth. The perceived 
population explosion was just the natural continuation of hyperbolic growth. The fast growth of 
population has no mathematically determinable beginning. 
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Figure 2. Data describing growth of the world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Maddison, 2010), 
expressed in billions of 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars, are compared with hyperbolic 
distribution defined by parameters 21.716 10a −×= and 68.671 10k −×= Growth of the world GDP 
was increasing monotonically along a hyperbolic trajectory. The fast growth in recent years had no 
mathematically determinable beginning suggesting strongly that the fast-increasing combined 
effects of anthropogenic activities, which are reflected in the economic growth, also had no 
mathematically determinable beginning.   
 
 
Figure 3. Growth of the world population (Nielsen, 2016c, 2017c) during the AD time. Data from a 
complete set are used (see text). Calculated trajectory accounts for the major transition between 
two hyperbolic trajectories (425 BC – AD 510) and for a minor disturbance of the hyperbolic 
growth, which occurred between AD 1195 and AD 1470. Industrial Revolution had no impact on 
shaping growth trajectory. Parameters describing these calculations are listed in my earlier 
publications (Nielsen, 2016c, 2017c). There was no Great Acceleration around 1950. 
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Figure 4. Magnified section of the growth of population presented in Figure 3. There was no Great 
Acceleration around 1950 or at any other time but only a minor and temporary boosting. From 
around 1963, growth of the world population follows a continually decelerating trajectory (Nielsen, 
2017e; United Nations, 2015; US Census Bureau, 2017).  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Data for the world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between AD 1 and 2008 (Maddison, 
2010), expressed in billions of 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars, are compared with 
hyperbolic distribution. The recent fast-increasing economic growth had no mathematically 
determinable beginning, strongly suggesting that the recent fast increasing intensity of the combined 
effects of anthropogenic activities, which are reflected in the economic growth, also had no 
mathematically determinable beginning. Industrial Revolution had no impact on shaping economic 
growth trajectory, even in Western Europe and even in the United Kingdom (Nielsen, 2014, 2016b, 
2016l, 2017f). There was no Great Acceleration around 1950. On the contrary, from around 1950, 
growth of the world GDP, which represents total consumption of natural resources, started to be 
diverted to a slower trajectory, which was initially decelerating but is now following an accelerating 
exponential distribution (Nielsen, 2015). The new exponential trajectory is slower than the historical 
hyperbolic distribution. 
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Figure 6. Distribution describing income per capita (GDP/cap) obtained by dividing distributions 
shown in Figures 1 and 2.  The best fit to the data is represented by a monotonically increasing 
linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution (Nielsen, 2017a). Income per capita was approximately 
constant in the past but most recently it was fast increasing, However, there was no sudden transition 
from the slow to fast growth. These results suggest that the combined effects anthropogenic activities 
per person might have been also approximately constant in the past but they were gradually 
increasing. There is no mathematically determinable beginning of their fast increase.  
 
 
Figure 7. Extended data describing growth of income per capita (GDP/cap) (Maddison, 
2010) are compared with the linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution (Nielsen, 2017a). 
There was no Great Acceleration in 1950 but a deceleration and diversion to a slower 
trajectory. 
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3.2. Foreign direct investment 
 
 
Figure 8.  Global foreign direct investment (FDI) in trillions of the current US$. The simplest 
mathematical representation of growth is by the second-order exponential distribution based on the 
simplest liner representation of the growth rate.  Its parameters are: 40 1.380 10a ×=  
1
1 1.405 10a − ×=  and 
3
2 3.575 10a
−×= . It was a gradually accelerating trajectory because 2 0a >
Growth was oscillating around a monotonically increasing trajectory until 2000. From that year, it 
became strongly unstable and unpredictable. There was no abrupt acceleration at any time but there 
are signs of deceleration and of a diversion to a slower pattern of growth.  
 
 
Figure 9.  Global foreign direct investment displayed using semilogarithmic scales of reference, 
showing more clearly that growth was oscillating around a monotonically increasing trajectory and 
that from around 2000 it started to follow a generally slower pattern of growth.  
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3.3. Growth of urban population 
 
Figure 10.  Growth of the world urban population in billions. Initially, and up to around 1960, 
growth rate was increasing linearly with the size of human population. Growth of urban population 
was following a pseudo-hyperbolic trajectory defined by parameters 71.536 10C ×=  , 
3
1 7.658 10a
−×=  and  22 2.798 10a −×= . From around 1960 it was diverted to a slower and 
gradually decelerating second-order exponential trajectory as indicated by the linearly decreasing 
growth rate. Parameters of this slower trajectory are: 20 4.345 10a − ×=  11 4.133 10a −×=  and 
5
2 9.776 10a
−− ×= . There was no Great Acceleration around 1950 but a deceleration around 1960 
and a commencement of a gradually decelerating trajectory. 
 
Figure 11.  Semilogarithmic display of the growth of the global urban population. This graph shows 
more clearly that the growth of urban population was following a monotonically increasing 
trajectory and that it was diverted to a slower and gradually decelerating trajectory. There was no 
Great Acceleration around 1950 or around any other time. On the contrary there was an abrupt 
deceleration around 1960 and a diversion to a slower, continually decelerating, trajectory.  
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3.4. Consumption of primary energy 
 
Figure 12. Global consumption of primary energy in exajoules [EJ]. Consumption was 
increasing hyperbolically until 1950. This trajectory was indicated by the analysis of reciprocal 
values of data and of the growth rate. Its parameters are: 15.356 10a −×=  and  42.705 10k −×= . 
Around 1950, global consumption of primary energy was decelerated and diverted to a gradually 
decelerating second-order exponential trajectory. It parameters are: 20 3.955 10a − ×= , 
1
1 3.799 10a
−×= and 52 8.954 10a
−− ×= . There was no Great Acceleration around 1950 but a 
deceleration and a diversion to a slower, continually decelerating trajectory. 
 
3.5. Consumption of fertilizers 
 
 
Figure 13. Global consumption of fertilizers (in million tonnes) was increasing monotonically by 
following a second-order exponential trajectory ( 20 7.788 10a ×= , 11 8.646 10a −− ×= and 
4
2 2.393 10a
−×= ) until around 1972 when it was decelerated and diverted to a slower trajectory. 
The slower growth reached an unexpected maximum around 1989 and the consumption of fertilizers 
started to decrease. The decline continued until around 1993 when the consumption of fertilizers 
started to follow an even slower and gradually decelerating second-order exponential trajectory       
described by parameters 20 6.341 10a − ×= , 11 6.195 10a −×= and 42 1.500 10a −− ×= . The was no 
Great Acceleration around 1950 or around any other time. 
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Figure 14. Global consumption of fertilizers (in million tonnes) is shown here using semilogarithmic 
scales of reference. This diagram shows clearly that there was no abrupt acceleration in the growth 
trajectory around 1950. It also demonstrates that there was a deceleration around 1972 and a 
diversion to a slower trajectory, which reached an unexpected maximum, started to decrease and 
increase again along an even slower and gradually decelerating trajectory.  
 
3.6. Large dams 
 
Figure 15. Global number of existing large dams, in thousands. Growth rate was initially increasing 
along a linear trajectory, indicating a monotonically increasing and gradually accelerating second-
order exponential growth of the number of existing large dams ( 20 2.734 10a ×= , 
1
1 3.208 10a
−− ×= and 52 9.305 10a −×= ). From around 1965, growth rate was decreasing linearly 
with the number of existing dams, indicating logistic growth defined by parameters: 
727.642 10C ×= , 20 8.689 10a −×= and 31 4.599 10a −− ×= . The calculated limit to growth is 18.9 
thousand. The value recorded for 2010 is 18.3. There was no Great Acceleration in 1950 or at any 
other time. 
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Figure 16. Global number of existing large dams in thousands displayed here by using 
semilogarithmic scales of reference. Growth was increasing monotonically until around 1965 when 
it was diverted to a slower and gradually decelerating trajectory. There was no Great Acceleration 
in 1950 or at any other time. 
 
3.7. Water consumption 
 
 
Figure 17. Global consumption of water, in cubic kilometres, was increasing hyperbolically until 
around 1979. Its parameters are: 13.025 10a ×=  and  21.513 10k −×= . In around 1979, world water 
consumption was decelerated. From that time on, growth rate was small and constant generating a 
slow exponential growth ( 93.310 10c −×=  ,  21.041 10r −×= ). It is a slowly accelerating growth. 
Growth rate is only 1.04% per year. There was no Great Acceleration in 1950 or at any other time. 
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3.8. Paper production 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Paper production was following a gradually decelerating, second-order, exponential 
trajectory ( 20 9.279 10a − ×= , 11 9.072 10a −×= , 42 2.202 10a −− ×= ). There was no abrupt 
acceleration at any time. 
 
 
3.9. Transportation 
 
 
Figure 19. Global transportation has been increasing along a gradually decelerating second-order 
exponential trajectory described by the following parameters: 20 9.279 10a − ×= , 
1
1 9.072 10a
−×=
and 42 2.202 10a
−− ×= . 
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3.10. Telecommunication 
 
 
Figure 20. Global telecommunication (billions of landlines and subscriptions). The three 
components of growth can be identified only by the analysis of the growth rate. Telecommunication 
was increasing exponentially until 1991 ( 513.944 10c −×= , 25.798 10r −×= ). Around 1991, growth 
rate increased abruptly and growth was accelerating along a faster, second-order, exponential 
trajectory ( 40 2.945 10a ×= , 11 2.964 10a − ×= , 32 7.457 10a −×= ). From around 2000, growth rate 
was decreasing and could be approximated either by a linear or exponential trajectory. Exponential 
trajectory was chosen because it is more likely that the number of landlines and subscription will 
be approaching asymptotically a certain constant value rather than that it will be irrevocably 
decreasing.  The current trajectory is tentatively described by pseudo-logistic distribution                      
( 22.200 10C ×= , 308.256 10a ×= , 23.645 10b −− ×= ). There was no Great Acceleration around 
1950 but only a temporary acceleration commencing around 1991 and ending around 2000. This 
small but sustained acceleration is revealed only by studying the growth rate. 
 
3.11. International tourism  
 
Figure 21. Global international tourism was increasing along a decelerating second-order 
exponential trajectory ( 30 2.060 10a ×= , 01 2.030 10a ×= , 42 4.982 10a −− ×= ). There was no 
abrupt acceleration at any time. 
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3.12. Atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide   
 
Figure 22. Atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide was initially following a slowly increasing 
and accelerating second-order exponential trajectory ( 10 1.481 10a ×= , 21 1.048 10a −− ×= , 
6
2 2.991 10a
−×= ). From around 1965, it suddenly accelerated and started to follow a faster and 
accelerating second-order exponential trajectory ( 10 7.835 10a ×= , 
2
1 7.721 10a
−− ×= , 
5
2 2.049 10a
−×= ). This sudden acceleration cannot be used in support of the concept of the Great 
Acceleration because atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide is made of anthropogenic and 
natural components.   
   
3.13. Carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels    
 
 
 
Figure 23. Global emissions of carbon dioxide from burning fossil fuels (in million tonnes of 
carbon). Data were compiled by the Earth Policy Institute (EPI, 2013). From 1770, emissions of 
carbon dioxide were increasing but they were oscillating around a gradually decelerating second-
order exponential trajectory ( 20 1.432 10a − ×= , 
1
1 1.230 10a
−×= , 52 2.346 10a
−− ×= ). There was 
no Great Acceleration around 1950 or around any other time. 
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3.14. Concentration of the atmospheric nitrous oxide (N2O)  
 
 
Figure 24. Atmospheric concentration of nitrous oxide (N2O), expressed in parts per billion [ppb], 
was initially decreasing along a second-order exponential trajectory ( 10 4.727 10a
−− ×= , 
3
1 6.898 10a
−×=  , 62 1.956 10a
−− ×= ). From around 1850, growth rate was increasing linearly 
with the level of concentration, generating a pseudo-hyperbolic growth ( 142.406 10C −− ×= , 
2
0 1.198 10a
−− ×= , 51 4.546 10a
−×= ). Nitrous oxide concentration is made of natural and 
anthropogenic components. There was no sudden acceleration around 1950 but only around 1850. 
 
3.15. Concentration of the atmospheric methane (CH4)  
 
Figure 25. Atmospheric concentration of methane (CH4) in parts per billion [ppb]. Growth rate was 
initially increasing linearly with the level of concentration but from around 1980 it was decreasing 
linearly with time. Growth of methane concentration was initially pseudo-hyperbolic, described by 
the following parameters: 135.007 10C −− ×= , 20 1.072 10a −− ×= and 51 1.587 10a −×= . However, 
from around 1980 it was following a slower and gradually decelerating second-order exponential 
trajectory ( 20 7.863 10a − ×= , 
1
1 7.915 10a
−×=  , 42 1.973 10a
−− ×= ), reaching a predictable 
maximum in 2006. From 2006, it shows signs of a renewed increase. Methane emissions are made 
of natural and anthropogenic components. Nevertheless, there was no Great Acceleration around 
1950 or around any other time. 
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3.16. Loss of stratospheric ozone 
 
 
Figure 26. Loss of stratospheric ozone was increasing exponentially ( 541.139 10c −×=  ,  
26.446 10r −×= ) at the fast rate of 6.45% per year. From around 1992, gross rate is hard to analyse 
but it appears to be decreasing. Loss of stratospheric ozone appears to be steadily but slowly 
decreasing.  
 
3.17. Ocean acidification 
 
Figure 27. Ocean acidification, described by the mean concentration of hydrogen ions (H+) in 
nmol/kg,  was increasing along a slow hyperbolic trajectory ( 13.553 10a −×=  , 41.087 10k −×= ) but 
from around 1965 it suddenly accelerated and started to follow an approximately four times faster 
trajectory, as defined by the parameter k . Its parameters are: 19.975 10a −×=  , 44.353 10k −×= . 
Ocean acidification is made of natural and anthropogenic contributions. 
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3.18. Marine fish capture 
 
 
Figure 28. Global marine fish capture (in million tonnes per year) was following a gradually 
decelerating second-order exponential trajectory ( 30 2.714 10a − ×= , 01 2.722 10a ×= , 
4
2 6.814 10a
−− ×= ). It reached a predictable maximum in 1997 and stared to decline. There was 
never an abrupt acceleration but a continuing deceleration. 
 
3.19. Global shrimp production 
 
 
Figure 29. Global shrimp production by aquaculture (in million tonnes). Production was increasing 
by following a continually accelerating second-order exponential trajectory ( 40 1.220 10a ×= , 
1
1 1.255 10a − ×= , 
3
2 3.226 10a
−×= ) until around 1990 when it decelerated and was diverted to a 
slower but continually accelerating exponential trajectory ( 775.718 10c −×= , 28.798 10r −×= ). Its 
doubling time is 7.3 years. There was never a sudden acceleration but only a sudden deceleration in 
1990 and a diversion to a slower but still accelerating trajectory. 
 
 
23 
 
3.20. Global loss of tropical forests 
 
 
Figure 30. Global loss of tropical forests (in percent of the forest area in 1700) was following a 
steadily accelerating exponential trajectory ( 112.337 10c −×= , 21.399 10r −×= ) until around 1960 
when it was decelerated and diverted to a slower but still continually accelerating exponential 
trajectory ( 69.640 10c −×= , 37.388 10r −×= ) . There was no Great Acceleration in 1950 or around 
any other time but there was a deceleration close to that year. 
 
3.21. Agricultural land area 
 
 
 
Figure 31. Global agricultural land area (per cent of the total land area). Analysis of growth rate 
indicated three stages of growth: slow exponential to 1850 ( 67.357 10c −×= , 35.315 10r −×= ), 
faster exponential between 1850 and 1960 ( 82.301 10c −×= , 38.428 10r −×= ) and a slower, 
decelerating second-order exponential trajectory from 1960 ( 20 1.007 10a − ×= , 
2
1 9.847 10a
−×= , 
5
2 2.431 10a
−− ×= ). The small acceleration from 0.5% per year to 0.8% per year, which occurred 
around 1850, was revealed only by studying growth rate. There was no Great Acceleration around 
1950 or around any other time but only a small and hardly noticeable acceleration around 1850. 
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4. Summary, discussion and conclusions 
A summary of the mathematical analysis of anthropogenic signatures is presented in the 
Appendix. It includes not only signatures of purely anthropogenic origin but also signatures 
containing natural components. A briefer summary is presented in Table 2. It includes only 
anthropogenic signatures.  
 
Table 2. Search for the beginning of anthropogenic signaturesa 
 
Signature Data 
From 
Initial Recent Accel. Decel. Figures Great 
Accel. 
Population AD 1 A D 1950b 1963 1, 3, 4 X 
GDP AD 1 A Ac  1950 2, 5 X 
GDP/cap AD 1 A Ac  1950 6, 7 X 
FDI 1970 A U  2000 8, 9 ND 
Urban Pop. 1750 A D  1960 10, 11 X 
Energy 1750 A D  1950 12 X 
Fertilizers 1900 A D  1972 13, 14 X 
Large Dams 1750 A D  1965 15, 16 X 
Water 1901 A Ac,d  1979 17 X 
Paper 1961 D D  1961 18 ND 
Transportation 1963 D D  1963 19 ND 
Telecom. 1960 A D 1991b 2000 20 ND 
Tourism 1950 D D  1950 21 ND 
CO2 from Fuels  1751 D D  1770g 23 X 
Ozone 1950 A D  1992 26 ND 
Marine Fish  1950 D D  1950 28 ND 
Shrimp Prod. 1950 A Ac,e  1990 29 ND 
Tropical Forests 1750 A Ac,f  1960 30 X 
Arable Land 1750 A D 1850h 1960 31 X 
Data From – data discussed in this publication; Initial – initial growth trajectory; Recent – recent growth 
trajectory; Accel. – sudden acceleration; Decel. – sudden and sustained deceleration; Great Accel. – 
Great Acceleration around 1950; FDI – Foreign Direct Investment; A – accelerating growth; D – 
decelerating growth; U – strongly unstable growth; X – no Great Acceleration around 1950; ND – no 
earlier data.  
a) – Only anthropogenic signatures are listed. b) – Temporary boosting followed by a continuing 
deceleration.  c) – Significantly slower than the initial trajectory. d) – Slow acceleration at the rate of 
only 1% per year.  e) – Fast acceleration at the rate of 8.8% per year.  f) – Slow acceleration at the rate 
of only 0.8% per year. g) – Emissions were constant between 1751 and 1770; h) – Exponential growth 
boosted from 0.5% to 0.8% per year but from 1960 there is a continuing deceleration. 
 
 
4.1. The Great Deceleration 
A striking and unexpected result of the analysis presented here and summarised in Table 
2, is the commonly occurring decelerations in the intensity of anthropogenic signatures in 
the second half of the 20th century. Analysis of data demonstrates consistently that there 
was no Great Acceleration around 1950 but rather that there was a consistent, en-masse 
deceleration in growth trajectories, the phenomenon, which could be described as the Great 
Deceleration. Remarkably also, recent growth trajectories are generally decelerating, 
which gives hope for the future. 
Recent anthropogenic signatures are characterised by a rapid increase, but a rapid 
increase should not be interpreted as a sudden acceleration without first checking that it 
was a sudden acceleration. Fast-increasing distributions, which initially increase slowly, 
can be misleading and it is easy to make mistakes with their interpretations. Indeed, it 
appears that they are often incorrectly interpreted. Mistakes with their interpretations are 
made by even the most prominent and scrupulous scientists. It is, therefore, essential to be 
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always on guard when confronted with such distributions. They have to be always carefully 
and methodically analysed.  
The abrupt Great Acceleration around 1950, or more generally in the second half of the 
20th century did not happen, at least for the anthropogenic signatures listed in Table 2, i.e. 
for the signatures, which do not include the obvious natural contributions and which were 
published under the title of the Great Acceleration (IGBP, 2015).  The sudden Great 
Acceleration is an illusion contradicted by data. In its place, mathematical analysis of 
anthropogenic signatures reveals the Great Deceleration. It was an unexpected but striking 
result. 
It is remarkable that all these anthropogenic signatures have been decelerated. Most of 
them were diverted also to decelerating trajectories but some of them were diverted to 
accelerating trajectories. However, these new accelerating trajectories are not accelerating 
as rapidly as the original accelerating trajectories. There is now a greater chance that they 
will be also decelerated and diverted to decelerating trajectories. Notably, in this number 
of decelerated signatures there is the growth of global population and the global economic 
growth which, as suggested earlier, seems to reflect the combined total of all anthropogenic 
activities and impacts.   
The term Great Deceleration is introduced here as a clear contrast with the term the 
Great Acceleration, used for precisely the same anthropogenic signatures (IGBP, 2015), to 
point out that there was no Great Acceleration but the Great Deceleration. Data demonstrate 
the diametrically different interpretation of growth trajectories than the interpretation 
based on impressions, showing that a correct interpretation of data can be obtained only by 
their rigorous analysis. This principle is well known in science but for some reasons it was 
not applied to the study of anthropogenic signatures and it resulted in their serious 
misinterpretation.   
It is regrettable that with all the usual scientific precautions, the term great acceleration 
escaped scientific scrutiny, but there is always time to correct this mistake. Whatever 
reason might be produced to defend this term, its continuing use is not only undesirable but 
also scientifically unjustified. Even without specifying the time of the great acceleration, 
this term implies an acceleration at a certain time. It implies that the beginning of the 
Anthropocene can be determined by locating the beginning of this alleged great 
acceleration. It implies that anthropogenic signatures were increasing slowly in the past but 
their increase suddenly accelerated at a certain time and that it continues to accelerate, 
which is simply not true. The perceived acceleration had no clearly marked beginning. The 
so-called Great Acceleration had no clear beginning. Furthermore, this perceived 
acceleration was recently decelerated and diverted to slower trajectories. It is not just the 
growth of population but also consumption of natural resources that became recently 
diverted to slower and generally even to decelerating trajectories. 
It is of concern that the concept of the Great Acceleration is not only accepted by 
scientific community but also presented to the general public without first checking it by a 
rigorous analysis of data. The article published on the Internet (IGBP, 2015) under the title 
Great Acceleration features prominently diagrams published earlier by Steffen et al. (2004) 
but now presented also under the title of Great Acceleration. Suitable hyperlinks are 
provided to assist in sharing this concept with a wide range of readers. This can be done as 
easily as by clicking a suitable link. It is an avalanche, which will be probably difficult to 
stop. There is also a natural human resistance against acknowledging mistakes and 
correcting them, a natural tendency to look for any possible excuse to avoid correcting a 
mistake.   
When mistakes are made within scientific community, they can be easily corrected 
because scientists know that science is a self-correcting discipline, but if general public is 
involved, its members are less forgiving.  
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However, even within scientific community, promoting the concept of the Great 
Acceleration around 1950, or of a sudden acceleration at any other time, is undesirable. It 
would be embarrassing to submit a final proposal for the acceptance of the Anthropocene 
as a new geological epoch only to be told that the widely accepted concept of the Great 
Acceleration, promoted by the same group of people, is not based on science but on 
illusions reinforced by strongly desired anticipations. If illusions can be so easily accepted, 
any other presented evidence can be also easily questioned. “The greatest enemy of 
knowledge is not ignorance, it is the illusion of knowledge” – Stephen Hawking.  
Concept of the Great Acceleration around 1950 is not based on a rigorous analysis of 
data but on impressions, but impressions can be misleading. “From these considerations 
then it is clear that the earth does not move, and that it does not lie elsewhere than at the 
centre” declared Aristotle in 350 BC (Aristotle, 2012, p. 14). However, what was so 
obviously and undeniably clear for Aristotle is now so obviously and undeniably incorrect.  
Mistakes can be made in scientific investigations but mistakes are always corrected 
when they are positively identified. This is how science works. Sometimes it takes longer 
to correct them, but it is always preferable to correct them immediately.   
The Great Acceleration understood as an abrupt and prominent increase in growth 
trajectories is an illusion. Data show that there was no such prominent and sustained abrupt 
increase. Great Acceleration interpreted in some other general sense is also an illusion 
because there were, and still are great decelerations. Emissions of carbon dioxide from 
fossil fuels, paper production, transportation, tourism and global marine fish capture have 
been following decelerating trajectories all the time, or at least for as long as indicated by 
available data. They were increasing but decelerating.  
It is incorrect to interpret fast increase as an acceleration because fast increase could be 
also decelerating. It is incorrect to interpret anthropogenic signature as the Great 
Acceleration because some of them were decelerating all the time and all accelerating 
signatures have been decelerated and diverted to slower trajectories. The concept of the 
Great Acceleration is incorrect, imprecise and scientifically contradicted.  
The term, great acceleration, is inaccurate and misleading. It describes an illusion, 
which does not explain anything and which contains incorrect information. The correct 
term is the rapid increase. It is not as dramatic as the great acceleration but describes 
accurately growth trajectories without suggesting the misleading, imprecise and incorrect 
interpretations.  
The term Great Acceleration is impressive because it sounds so dramatic. However, its 
continuing use might turn out to be counterproductive when people discover that there was 
no great acceleration but great deceleration. The concept of the Anthropocene expresses 
the justified concern about human impacts on the environment but the concept of the Great 
Acceleration is an unnecessary aberration. Younger generations need to be warned but they 
also need to be encouraged. They need to have a correct, precise and reliable scientific 
information. They will have to be convinced that they can trust science. They also have to 
see that maybe not all is lost and that there is still hope for a sustainable future, and the 
evidence-based pattern, described here as the Great Deceleration, gives such a hope. There 
is still hope that humans will learn to live within their means. Rather than crash landing 
caused by the Great Acceleration, there might be a soft landing assisted by the Great 
Deceleration. This evidence-based interpretation of anthropogenic signatures could 
encourage various sections of community to increase their efforts in order to work harder 
towards a sustainable future.    
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4.2. The beginning 
The search for the beginning of strong anthropogenic signatures produced negative 
results. Summary of results presented in Table 2 shows that even though the trajectories 
describing anthropogenic signatures are now, in general, decelerating, most of them were 
initially accelerating. Maybe we could even describe this almost common acceleration as 
a great acceleration but it would be an acceleration of a different kind than used in the 
concept of the Great Acceleration around 1950, which never happened. It is a great 
acceleration, which does not have a clearly marked beginning. What we see is a part of a 
great acceleration, which continued for thousands or even millions of years.  
The Anthropocene is the age of humans but humans and their activities did not emerge 
suddenly in the past few hundred years but much earlier. Growth of human population was 
slow in the past but it was steadily increasing along predominantly steadily accelerating 
hyperbolic trajectories for at least 2,000,000 years (Nielsen, 2017c; see Figure 32). It was 
not a chaotic growth with many random ups and downs but a generally steady hyperbolic 
growth.  Similar time dependence is also for the economic growth (De Long, 1998; Nielsen, 
2017c). When growth of population and economic growth are very slow, as they were in 
the past, their ratio is approximately constant (2016i, 2017a; see also Figure 6) and 
economic growth is approximately directly proportional to the growth of population. The 
study of the dynamics of the growth of human population and of the economic growth 
shows that hyperbolic trajectories were exceptionally stable and robust.   
 
Figure 32. Growth of human population in the past 2,000,000 years (Nielsen, 2017c) 
 
Hyperbolic growth is steadily accelerating and its acceleration is directly proportional 
to the size of the growing entity. For a long time, it was slow but it was gradually increasing 
until it reached the fast acceleration experienced in recent time. The recent fast acceleration 
in the growth of population and in the economic growth did not happen suddenly. Contrary 
to the commonly accepted interpretation of the growth of population, there was no sudden 
population explosion. There was also no sudden burst in the economic growth. The 
perceived sudden explosion is an illusion created by the strongly deceptive hyperbolic 
distributions (Nielsen, 2014, 2017f).  
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It is tempting to use the Industrial Revolution to mark the beginning of the 
Anthropocene. However, there are no suitable data, which could be used to carry out a 
detailed analysis of anthropogenic signatures before and after this event to check whether 
there was a sudden acceleration, but there are data for the key anthropogenic indicators: the 
growth of population and economic growth. They clearly show that Industrial Revolution 
had no impact on shaping their trajectories, even in Western Europe and even in the United 
Kingdom (Nielsen, 2014, 2016b, 2016e, 2016g, 2016l, 2017f; see also Figures 3-5). 
Industrial Revolution did not trigger a sudden acceleration in these two anthropogenic 
signatures. Consequently, Industrial Revolution cannot be used to determine the beginning 
of the Anthropocene, but maybe it can be used to define it.  
The steady increase in the growth of human population and in the economic growth 
could be described as a great acceleration because it was not only increasing but also 
accelerating over a long time. It can be expected that the intensity of various anthropogenic 
activities and impacts was also increasing and maybe even accelerating, as suggested by a 
few recent examples shown in Table 2 and by the initially accelerating economic growth.  
The steadily increasing growth of population and of economic growth in the past 
2,000,000 years suggest that the Anthropocene evolved over a long time. It transcends the 
Pleistocene and Holocene epochs and it has no clearly marked beginning in recent years. 
Its beginning is lost in the mist of time, somewhere around 2,000,000 years ago or even 
earlier. The onset of hominine interaction with the environment could be perhaps traced to 
the emergence of the Oldowan tools around 2.5 million years ago, which was followed by 
countless other innovations, until their impacts became gradually strong and global, in 
much the same way as the growth of population and economic growth became also 
gradually so fast that they created an impression of a sudden explosion, but there was no 
sudden transition from slow to fast growth. How can we tell which of the gradually 
developing anthropogenic activities in the past contributed to the momentum of growth of 
the most recent trajectories? The present is strongly liked with the past and there is no clear 
demarcation line between the past and the present, except for the clear demarcation line 
determined by the recent decelerations.   
The second half of the 20th century does not mark the beginning of the intensification 
of anthropogenic signatures, as suggested by the concept of the Great Acceleration, which 
is contradicted by data. On the contrary, the second half of the 20th century is marked by 
decelerations of the distributions describing the intensity of anthropogenic signatures. It is 
probably the beginning of the end of the strongest impacts and maybe even a gradual 
transition to a sustainable future.  
Growth of population, which was steadily accelerating over the past 2,000,000 years 
has been decelerated and diverted to a slower trajectory from 1963. The steadily 
accelerating economic growth has been also decelerated and diverted to a slower trajectory 
from around 1950. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the intensity of other 
anthropogenic signatures was also recently decelerated. However, as mentioned earlier, 
these results were unexpected. Reasons for the Great Deceleration could be investigated to 
understand its mechanism. It is also not known whether the observed Great Deceleration 
applies to other anthropogenic signatures, which were not listed in the IGBP sets of data. 
The ages-long process leading to the recent critically strong anthropogenic activities and 
impacts might be now coming to an end.  
 
4.3. Is it a new geological epoch?  
“No one can deny the role of the human species in altering the global environment, but 
so did many biological innovations, like the first burrowing animals at the beginning of the 
Cambrian Period, and the rise of terrestrial forests in the Carboniferous” (Gehling, 2018).   
The problem is not with recognising the strong anthropogenic impacts on the environment 
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but only in deciding whether recent human activities are causing a transition to a new 
geological epoch.  
However, even if humans are now shaping a new geological epoch, it is still an ongoing 
process. It is probably too early to look for a proof of a transition from Holocene to 
Anthropocene. Maybe 1000 or 10,000 years from now, humans (if they survive) will look 
back and show that there was such a geological transition, but not now. Furthermore, the 
Great Deceleration seems to indicate that the power of shaping a new geological epoch by 
anthropogenic activities and impacts is now probably decreasing. 
In order to have the Anthropocene recognised as a new geological epoch a search is now 
conducted for a convincing stratigraphic marker. However, this is precisely the problem 
with recognising the Anthropocene as a new geological epoch. There appears to be no 
stratigraphic need to use the concept of the Anthropocene as a new geological epoch. There 
is, however, a need to find stratigraphic evidence to support this concept. As noted by 
Finney and Edwards “the concept of the Anthropocene did not derive from the stratigraphic 
record” (Finney & Edwards, 2015, p. 6). There is no clear stratigraphic marker, which can 
be used to show convincingly a transition from Holocene to Anthropocene and it is 
probably even too early to look for such a marker. The way it is attempted to prove that 
Anthropocene is a new geological epoch is first to define a marker and then to look for it 
in stratigraphic deposits. This does not appear to be the way geological research is 
conducted.    
There has been also too much attention focused on determining the beginning of the 
Anthropocene but so far, all attempts failed, and now we can understand why. The 
Anthropocene had no clear beginning in recent years and the widely accepted concept of 
marking this beginning by the beginning of the Great Acceleration is based on illusion 
because there was no Great Acceleration. There was no sudden acceleration in 
anthropogenic activities.  
For the Anthropocene to be recognised as a new geological epoch, its beginning is far 
less important than a convincing stratigraphic evidence. It does not matter whether a 
transition from Holocene to Anthropocene occurred around the time of the Industrial 
Revolution, or in 1945, marking the first explosion of atomic bombs, or around 1950 the 
time of the alleged Great Acceleration that never happened, or at any other time during the 
second half of the 20th century. What matters is whether there was a transition. First, a 
convincing stratigraphic evidence has to be produced and only then one can worry about 
its timing. “Regrettably, focusing on the definition of the beginning of the Anthropocene 
can result in the lack of consideration of its stratigraphic content and its concept. It conveys 
the opinion that units of the geologic time scale are defined solely by their beginnings, 
rather than their content” (Finney & Edwards, 2015, p. 7).  
If human activities are indeed shaping a new geological epoch, then transition to this 
new epoch is not marked by just one activity, such nuclear explosions or the production of 
plastics, but by the whole range of anthropogenic activities. A convincing stratigraphic 
marker caused by a single human activity will only show human presence but it will not 
prove that human presence caused a transition to a new geological epoch. If, for instance, 
a convincing stratigraphic evidence of nuclear explosions is found, it will only prove that 
there were nuclear explosions, which we already know, but it will not prove that nuclear 
explosions caused a transition from Holocene to Anthropocene. Perhaps humans are 
gradually causing a transition to a new geological epoch but this is still an ongoing process. 
Its geological impacts might perhaps become clear in a distant future, maybe through a 
collection of stratigraphic markers. It is probably too early to look for them now. 
There is also a question of the time scale and time resolution. Geological changes occur 
over a long time. Attempts of finding a marker defining a transition from Holocene to 
Anthropocene appear to be based not only on the assumption that a single human activity, 
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such as nuclear explosions or the production of plastics, could be used as an acceptable 
prove of such a geological transition but also that this transition occurred over only a few 
decades. Is it reasonable to expect that a transition to a new geological epoch would have 
occurred over such a short time or that it was caused by such a single and miniscule event? 
If the transition to a new geological epoch is ongoing, would it not be more reasonable to 
expect that a convincing evidence might be produced in the future?  
Efforts of proving that the Anthropocene is a new geological epoch appear to be 
scientifically unjustified. The correct way of doing it is to wait for a clear and convincing 
stratigraphic evidence and only then to propose that there was a transition from Holocene 
to Anthropocene. This can happen only in the future.    
However, is it really so vitally important to have the Anthropocene recognised as a new 
geological epoch? Nothing is going to change in the intensity of anthropogenic signatures 
if the Anthropocene is recognised as a new geological epoch. The Anthropocene might or 
might not be a new geological epoch. At present, it is just a convenient name to describe 
the recent strong anthropogenic impacts on the environment. It originated as a proposed 
name for a new geological epoch but so far, all attempts to prove that it is a new geological 
epoch were unsuccessful.  
Analysis of the past growth of population and of the economic growth makes it clear 
why it is so formidably difficult to determine the beginning of the Anthropocene. There 
was simply no recent beginning.  It is hard to do what is impossible to do. It is like trying 
to find a beginning of a circle. In the same category could be also the current efforts to 
prove that the Anthropocene is a new geological epoch. Maybe it is also impossible to do.  
Research projects are not necessarily abandoned just because they are difficult. Difficult 
research projects can lead to important discoveries but the current attempts of proving that 
the Anthropocene is a new geological epoch does not appear to be promising.    
 
4.4. Further research  
Two types of research activities related to the topic of the Anthropocene appear to be 
misdirected: (1) attempting to determine the beginning of the Anthropocene, because 
Anthropocene has no clear beginning in recent years, and (2) trying to prove that 
Anthropocene is a new geological epoch, because these efforts appear to be premature and 
scientifically unjustified.  
The Anthropocene is real. For the first time in human history, humans have a profound 
global impact on the environment. For the first time, humans are shaping their own future 
and, to a certain degree, even the future of our planet. However, this profound global impact 
did not start at any particular time and it did not necessarily cause a transition to a new 
geological epoch. It evolved over a long time and it gradually became global. The 
Anthropocene can be recognised as a new phenomenon but its global impact has no clearly 
determinable beginning and it does not appear to mark a new geological epoch. It appears 
that the most important issue in studying the Anthropocene is to try to understand its 
mechanism.  
The evidence supporting the concept of the Great Deceleration is overwhelmingly 
strong but it is limited. It might be possible that some other anthropogenic signatures, which 
are not listed in the IGBP publication, did not decelerate. Other data should be found and 
analysed. However, data for other signatures should be over a sufficiently long range of 
time to make a positive identification of a sudden acceleration or deceleration.  
In contrast, the concept of the Great Acceleration around 1950 or in the second half of 
the 20th century is contradicted by a rigorous analysis of data. This concept originated also 
from an examination of a limited set of data but it was only a visual examination. It is a 
concept, which is based on impressions but now is shown to be contradicted by data, 
remarkably even by the same data, which were used in its support.  
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When looking for other examples of anthropogenic activities and impacts it is essential 
to understand that fast-increasing trajectories should not be automatically interpreted as 
accelerating trajectories. It is like driving a car fast and then trying to stop it. The car will 
be decelerating but the driving distance will be still increasing, and maybe even increasing 
fast.  
Accelerating trajectories are characterised by a constant or increasing growth rate. The 
decelerating trajectories are characterised by a decreasing growth rate. If the growth rate is 
positive and decreasing, growth trajectory will be increasing. Depending on the value of 
the growth rate, it can be also increasing fast. Consequently, it would be incorrect to claim 
that every fast-increasing trend is accelerating. A trajectory might be rapidly increasing but 
not necessarily accelerating.  
In order to see whether a given trend is accelerating or decelerating it is necessary to 
carry out mathematical analysis. Examples of fast-increasing anthropogenic signatures are 
meaningless unless it can be proven that they are represented by either accelerating or 
decelerating trajectories. Furthermore, as already mentioned, for a small range of data, it 
might be impossible to decide whether an accelerating trajectory is a result of an earlier 
deceleration. Table 2 lists some examples of such accelerating trajectories, which resulted 
from the earlier deceleration and economic growth is one of them. It was originally 
accelerating along a fast-increasing hyperbolic trajectory. It became decelerated and now 
is accelerating along a significantly slower trajectory, which is less critical than the earlier 
hyperbolic trajectory and which is easier to divert to a decelerating trajectory. 
In discussions of other possible examples of anthropogenic signatures, distinction 
should be also made between desirable and undesirable trends. The accelerating 
undesirable trends reduce the probability of sustainable future but accelerating desirable 
trends increase its probability. Furthermore, even decelerating trends might be 
unsustainable. Trends can also change, to better or worse.  
For instance, growth rate of the world population was steadily decreasing from 1963. 
The corresponding trajectory describing growth of population has been decelerating. The 
optimistically predicted maximum is around 12 billion (Nielsen, 2017e; United Nations, 
2015). However, a more likely outcome is an asymptotic maximum of 15.6 billion (Nielsen, 
2017e). Will any of these predicted maxima be sustainable? However, growth rate is now 
decreasing so slowly that it is almost constant. If it is going to remain constant, growth of 
the world population will be accelerating along an exponential trajectory and will be 
unsustainable.  
Growth rate for the growth of population in China has been decreasing. Growth 
trajectory was decelerating but it was still increasing. However, from around 2008, growth 
rate started to hover around a constant value (World Bank, 2017). If this pattern is going to 
continue, growth of population in China will be accelerating along an exponential 
trajectory. 
World economic growth has now settled around an accelerating exponential growth. 
However, its constant growth rate can, in due time, start to decrease when, for instance, 
economic stress is going to reach a high level. If this is going to happen, the current 
accelerating trajectory will be changed to a decelerating trajectory with a prospect of a 
sustainable future.   
Another issue, which could be further investigated, apart from studying other 
anthropogenic signatures, is to try to explain the mechanism of the Great Deceleration. 
There could be various contributing factors such as improved environmental management, 
limits of Earth system and cross interaction between various anthropogenic activities and 
impacts. Each anthropogenic signature is also probably characterised by a different 
mechanism of growth. The distinction should be also made between potentially harmful 
and potentially beneficial human activities such as the increasing use of alternative sources 
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of energy or the increasing use of electronic media, which gradually replaces paper 
production. All such studies could help to asses a chance for sustainable future. 
Self-regulation is not necessarily imposed by the improvement in human interaction 
with Nature or by the limits and boundaries of the Earth system. Even with unlimited 
resources, there could be still a limit to growth. For instance, world economic growth was 
increasing along a hyperbolic trajectory but from 1950 it started to be diverted to a slower 
trajectory. This deceleration did not happen because all nations in the world agreed amiably 
and unanimously to stop following hyperbolic trajectory and to slow down their economic 
activities. There was no such mutual agreement. This deceleration was also not imposed by 
the critical boundaries of the Earth system because economic growth continues to increase 
and even to accelerate. The deceleration occurred spontaneously probably because it was 
simply impossible to cope with such a fast-hyperbolic growth. Economic growth started to 
follow a decelerating trajectory but gradually, its growth rate approached asymptotically a 
constant value, which describes exponential growth (Nielsen, 2015). It is a slower growth 
than the previous hyperbolic growth but accelerating. It is also an unsustainable growth and 
it will have to be terminated either by a diversion to a slower trajectory or by a collapse. 
Maybe this termination will be dictated by ecological limits but maybe not. When, in due 
time, exponential growth is going to lead to a high-intensity production and consumption, 
it will be no longer supported. There is a limit to how much can be produced and consumed 
over a certain time and this limit does not necessarily depend on the availability of natural 
resources or on a decision of some kind of an international economic tribunal. However, 
with limitations of natural resources, limit to growth can be reached earlier. Self-regulation 
might be helpful but controlled regulation is likely to produce better results.    
It would be interesting, to study the mechanism of the Great Deceleration. What caused 
this remarkable transition. Was it a common cause or different causes for different 
signatures? It would be interesting to see whether similar decelerations are reflected in 
other anthropogenic signatures but most importantly it would be interesting to examine 
how the harmful and still accelerating trajectories could be also decelerated. It is a 
multidisciplinary challenge that could yield vital results. 
One of the puzzling features revealed by the current analysis is the sudden acceleration 
in the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration around 1965, which coincides with ocean 
acidification but is not correlated with the carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil 
fuels. Reasons for this sudden acceleration are unclear. 
Without a successful control of anthropogenic activities, there might be no 
Anthropocene. The Earth will survive without humans and so will also many other life 
forms. They will probably even thrive without humans. However, if humans are still around 
they will probably worry only about how to survive rather than about debating the 
beginning of the Anthropocene and proving that it is a new geological epoch. 
 
4.5. Concluding remarks  
When the concept of the Anthropocene as a new geological epoch was introduced it was 
surprising and even disappointing to see that it was criticised. Evidence supporting this 
concept seemed to be overwhelmingly strong. For the first time in human history, human 
population was increasing so fast that it was even described as the population explosion. 
For the first time in human history, humans were changing not just local but global 
environment, not just changing it but changing it fast. All the signs were indicating that 
humans had an extraordinary impact on shaping not only their own future but perhaps also 
the future of this planet.  
The concept of the Great Acceleration reinforced the concept of the Anthropocene as a 
new geological epoch but shifted the focus from the 1800s to the mid-1900s as the 
beginning of the explosive human impacts on the planet’s environment. It was like having 
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two explosions: one explosion around the 1800s and one around the 1950s, an apparent 
double confirmation that the Anthropocene could be a new geological epoch, except that 
the two explosions never happened, which illustrates how deceptive are the distributions 
associated with the concept of the Anthropocene. They have to carefully and methodically 
analysed; otherwise they lead easily to incorrect conclusions.  
The misinterpretation of data was not caused by some kind of a well-coordinated 
conspiracy to prove that the Anthropocene is a new geological epoch with a well 
determinable beginning but by the genuine difficulty to understand these data. It is simply 
impossible to interpret them correctly without a mathematical analysis but mathematical 
analysis is also difficult. Only hyperbolic growth is trivially easy to analyse. Other 
distributions are not. However, even with hyperbolic growth one has to be careful to 
identify it correctly.  
A brilliant scientist does not necessarily know how to analyse such data as describing 
anthropogenic signatures but a person who knows how to analyse them does not necessarily 
know how to interpret results of mathematical analysis. For instance, why was global water 
consumption diverted in around 1979 to such a dramatically slower trajectory? Why did 
global direct investments become so unstable from around 2000? Why was there a sudden 
increase in the atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration from around 1965 and why this 
sudden increase is not reflected in the carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels? Why was 
the atmospheric nitrous oxide concentration decreasing until around 1850? Why did the 
atmospheric methane concentration reach a maximum in around 2006 and why did it start 
to increase again? Why was the increase in the agricultural land area diverted in around 
1960 to a significantly slower and decelerating trajectory?     
With the concept of the Great Acceleration, demonstrated by a visual examination of 
data, it was easy to imagine that humans might have been causing a transition to a new 
geological epoch. If their past impact was strong, so strong that it was seen as a sudden 
explosion, it was just an introduction to an even greater explosion in the mid-1900s.  
However, after studying the dynamics of the growth of population and of the economic 
growth it became clear that the interpretation of the Anthropocene has to be changed. This 
extensive study indicated that human impacts did not commence suddenly. The 
Anthropocene is a part of a longer human history. It has no recent beginning and it does 
not appear to be a part of the geological timeline. Furthermore, the intensity of human 
impacts is now moderated.  
It is well known that growth of global population is now slowing down. Analysis of the 
economic growth has led to similar conclusions (Nielsen, 2016b, 2016e). Economic growth 
was also explosive, in much the same way as the growth of population, but both of them 
started to be diverted to slower trajectories, population from around 1963 and economic 
growth from around 1950. Not only the growth of population but also the total consumption 
of natural resources reflecting the combined intensity of anthropogenic signatures, started 
to be diverted to a slower trajectory.  
Results of the analysis presented here confirmed the earlier results based on the study 
of the growth of population and of economic growth. A search of the Great Acceleration 
revealed, unexpectedly but convincingly, the presence of the Great Deceleration. In 
retrospect, these new results should have been expected. They are in harmony with the 
results of the earlier analysis of the growth of population and of economic growth. All these 
results suggest new interpretation of the Anthropocene. Not only was there no Great 
Acceleration but, in its place, there is a Great Deceleration. The momentum of 
anthropogenic activities and of their impacts is now decreasing. In general, distributions 
describing the intensity of various anthropogenic signatures are not yet decreasing but 
decelerating. Maybe the irreparable damage has been already done but maybe humans are 
gradually learning how to improve their interaction with Nature. The unexpected Great 
Deceleration, which needs to be further investigated, gives hope for the future. The 
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decreasing momentum of anthropogenic impacts confirms and reinforces the reservations 
about the interpretation of the Anthropocene as a new geological epoch.  
Mathematical analysis of data shows that the Anthropocene has no clearly marked 
beginning in recent years. It also puts in doubt whether the Anthropocene is a new 
geological epoch. However, these two features do not diminish the significance of the 
Anthropocene. The key issue is not in finding the beginning of the Anthropocene, which is 
impossible, or to prove that it is a new geological epoch, which is probably premature, but 
to understand this uniquely new phenomenon, to learn how to control its impacts, how to 
understand its mechanism and how to shape a sustainable future. It is a multidisciplinary 
challenge. Whether it had a recent beginning or not, whether it is a new geological epoch 
or not, the Anthropocene is here to stay and the question is whether it will continue to 
dictate human future or whether its impacts could be suitably moderated, maybe even 
controlled.  
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Appendix  
 
The following list contains a more detailed summary of the mathematical analysis of 
anthropogenic signatures. 
 
1. Population: 
• Figures 1, 3 and 4 
• Data discussed her are from AD 1 
• Initially, hyperbolic growth (accelerating) 
• 1950 – minor temporary boosting 
• 1963 – growth decelerated and diverted to a slower and continually decelerating 
trajectory (Nielsen, 2017e; United Nations, 2015). 
• No Great Acceleration around 1950 or around any other time but only a minor 
temporary boosting followed by a continuing deceleration. 
2. Gross Domestic Product (GDP): 
• Figures 2 and 5 
• Data discussed her are from AD 1 
• Initially, hyperbolic growth (accelerating) 
• 1950 – growth decelerated and diverted to a slower trajectory 
• The new trajectory was initially decelerating but is now approaching 
asymptotically an accelerating exponential growth. 
• No Great Acceleration around 1950 but a deceleration and a diversion to a slower 
growth, which is now again accelerating. 
3. GDP/cap: 
• Figures 6 and 7 
• Data discussed her are from AD 1 
• Initially, linearly-modulated hyperbolic growth (accelerating)  
• 1950 – growth decelerated and diverted to a slower trajectory  
• No Great Acceleration around 1950 but deceleration around 1950 and diversion to 
a slower but still accelerating trajectory. 
4. Foreign direct investment: 
• Data from 1970 
• Figures 8 and 9 
• Initially, second-order exponential growth (accelerating) 
• 2000 – diversion to a slower but strongly unstable pattern of growth 
• No abrupt and sustained acceleration at any time but a diversion to a slower pattern 
of growth. 
5. Urban population: 
• Data from 1750 
• Figures 10 and 11 
• Initially, pseudo-hyperbolic growth (accelerating) 
• 1960 – growth decelerated and diverted to a slower and gradually decelerating 
trajectory  
• No Great Acceleration around 1950 or around any other time but a sustained 
deceleration from 1960. 
6. Consumption of primary energy: 
• Data from 1750 
• Figure 12 
• Initially, growth hyperbolic (accelerating) 
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• 1950 – growth decelerated and diverted to a slower and gradually decelerating 
trajectory 
• No Great Acceleration around 1950 or around any other time but a deceleration 
around that year and diversion to a continually decelerating trajectory. 
7. Consumption of fertilizers 
• Data from 1900 
• Figure 13 
• Initially, second-order exponential growth (accelerating) 
• 1972 – growth decelerated and diverted to a slower trajectory 
• 1989 – growth reached unexpected maximum and started to decrease 
• 1993 – growth diverted to an even slower and continually decelerating second-
order exponential trajectory 
• No Great Acceleration around 1950 but a deceleration around 1972. 
8. Large dams: 
• Data from 1750 
• Figures 15 and 16 
• Initially, growth was increasing monotonically along a second-order exponential 
trajectory (accelerating)   
• 1965 – growth decelerated and diverted to a slower and continually decelerating 
logistic trajectory  
• No Great Acceleration around 1950 but deceleration around 1965 and diversion to 
a continually decelerating trajectory. 
9. Water consumption: 
• Data from 1901 
• Figure 17 
• Initially, hyperbolic growth (accelerating) 
• 1979 - growth decelerated and diverted to a slow exponential trajectory 
(accelerating but very slowly at the rate of 1% per year) 
• No Great Acceleration around 1950 or around any other time but a deceleration in 
around 1979 and a diversion to a slower trajectory. 
10. Paper production: 
• Data from 1961 
• Figure 18 
• From the beginning, second-order exponential growth continually decelerating 
• No abrupt change in the growth trajectory but a continuing deceleration. 
11. Transportation: 
• Data from 1963 
• Figure 19 
• From the beginning, second-order exponential growth (decelerating) 
• No major abrupt change in the growth trajectory but a continuing deceleration.  
12. Telecommunication: 
• Data from 1960 
• Figure 20 
• Initially, exponential growth until 1991 (accelerating) 
• 1991 – temporary boosting 
• 2000 – deceleration and a diversion to a continually decelerating trajectory 
tentatively described by a pseudo-logistic distribution, because growth in the 
number of landlines and subscriptions is not likely to decrease but more likely to 
approach an asymptotic maximum.  
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13. International tourism: 
• Data from 1950 
• Figure 21 
• From the beginning, second-order exponential growth (decelerating) 
• No abrupt acceleration in the growth trajectory but a continuing deceleration.   
14. Atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide: 
• Data from 1750 
• Figure 22 
• Anthropogenic and natural contributions 
• 1750-1965 – second-order exponential growth (accelerating) 
• From 1965 – abrupt acceleration and diversion to a faster second-order exponential 
trajectory (accelerating)  
• Acceleration around 1965 cannot be used in support of the concept of the Great 
Acceleration because carbon dioxide concentration contains natural contributions 
15. Carbon dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels: 
• Data from 1751 
• Figure 23 
• 1751-1770 – emissions constant 
• From 1770 – emissions increasing but along a continually decelerating second-
order exponential trajectory 
• No Great Acceleration around 1950 but a continuing deceleration from around 
1770. 
16. Atmospheric concentration of nitrous oxide (N2O): 
• Data from 1750 
• Figure 24 
• Anthropogenic and natural components 
• 1750-1850 – a decreasing, second-order exponential distribution (decelerating) 
• From 1850 – growth accelerated and diverted to a continually accelerating 
pseudo-hyperbolic trajectory 
• No sudden acceleration around 1950 but around 1850. 
• This distribution cannot be used in support of the Great Acceleration because it 
contains natural components.  
17. Atmospheric concentration of methane (CH4): 
• Data from 1750 
• Figure 25 
• Anthropogenic and natural contributions 
• Initially, pseudo-hyperbolic growth until 1990 (accelerating) 
• 1990 – decelerated and diverted to a slower continually decelerating trajectory 
• 2006 – growth reached a predictable maximum and now shows signs of renewed 
increase 
• No Great Acceleration around 1950 
• Future trajectory unpredictable because of the insufficient number of data  
18. Loss of the stratospheric ozone: 
• Data from 1956 
• Figure 26 
• Initially, loss of stratospheric ozone was increasing exponentially, accelerating at 
the rate of 6.45% per year and doubling every 11 years. 
• From 1992 –slowly decreasing. 
• Future trajectory is hard to predict because of the combination of the poor-quality 
data and their short range. 
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19. Ocean acidification: 
• Data from 1850 
• Figure 27 
• Anthropogenic and natural contributions 
• 1850-1965 – slowly-increasing hyperbolic trajectory (accelerating) 
• From 1965 – a faster-increasing hyperbolic trajectory (accelerating) 
• No acceleration around 1950 but a clear acceleration around 1965, which cannot 
be used in support of the Great Acceleration because of the combination of natural 
and anthropogenic contributions to ocean acidification.  
20. Marine fish capture: 
• Data from 1950 
• Figure 28 
• From the beginning, fish capture has been following a second-order exponential 
and continually decelerating trajectory 
• 1997 – predictable maximum followed by decline 
• There was no sudden acceleration at any time but a continuing deceleration.  
21. Shrimp production: 
• Data from 1950 
• Figure 29 
• 1950-1990 – second-order exponential growth (accelerating) 
• 1990 – growth decelerated and diverted to a slower but still a fast-increasing 
exponential growth, accelerating at the high rate of 8.8% per year. 
• No sudden acceleration at any time to a faster trajectory but only a deceleration in 
around 1990 and a diversion to a slower but still accelerating trajectory.  
22. Loss of tropical forests: 
• Data from 1750 
• Figure 30 
• From the beginning, loss of tropical forests was increasing exponentially, 
accelerating at the rate of 1.4% per annum 
• 1960 – loss decelerated and diverted to a slower, exponential trajectory, which is 
accelerating but at a slower rate of 0.7% 
• No Great Acceleration in 1950 or at any other time but deceleration in around 1960 
to a slower but still accelerating trajectory.  
23. Agricultural land area: 
• Data from 1750 
• Figure 31 
• 1750-1850 – slow exponential growth, accelerating at the rate of 0.5% per year 
• 1850 – growth accelerated to a slightly faster exponential trajectory characterized 
by the growth rate of 0.8% per year 
• 1960 – growth was decelerated and diverted to a slower and continually 
decelerating second-order exponential trajectory. 
• No Great Acceleration in 1950 but only minor acceleration around 1850, which 
can be detected only by the examination of the growth rate. This acceleration was 
followed in 1960 by deceleration to a slower and continually decelerating 
trajectory. 
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